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Similarities between the non-deterministic nature of quantum theory and the unpredictable pat-
terns of human cognition and decision making have been observed and commented on many times
since the invention of Quantum Mechanics in the first part of the 20th century. Niels Bohr himself
took note of the parallels.[3] In fact, an entire field of study, Quantum Cognition, has been borne
from the study of this analogy. [3] However, many of the attempts to model human behavior with
quantum mechanics conflate the identity of a particle with its own wavefunction, which is incorrect
and invalidates the analogy. In this paper, we seek to make explicit this error, make necessary
corrections, and then deepen the analogy. We do this by creating a Quantum Decision Theory that
directly parallels Richard Feynman’s novel formulation of quantum mechanics published in 1948 at
Cornell University: “Space-Time Approach to Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics”.
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of quantum cognition hypothesizes that hu-
man behavior and decision making can best be mod-
eled using the framework of quantum mechanics designed
for physics in the late 20th century. In the framework
of quantum mechanics, particles lose their deterministic
properties, and instead obey laws of probability. This loss
of determinism is what makes the theory so attractive to
those interested in modeling human behavior. Humans
tend not to be deterministic, or in many cases, even deci-
sive. The mathematical machinery of quantum mechan-
ics is uniquely suited to approach just such a problem.
However, there exists a popular misinterpretation of
quantum theory wherein the “state” of a system, along
with its associated wavefunction, is understood to refer
to its measurable or physical manifestation. In this in-
terpretation, the current “state”, or wavefunction of the
system, is a superposition of the many available future
states that the system in question might be observed to
take on. In the context of decision making, the system
is a mind. Prior to making the decision, the state or
wavefunction consists of a superposition of all of the pos-
sible decisions. When the mind comes to a conclusion,
the wavefunction is said to collapse into the decision ac-
tually made. In this sense a decision amounts to a mea-
surement.
While intuitively attractive, this analogy to quantum
mechanics contains a fundamental flaw. It assumes ei-
ther that a quantum particle (in this case, a mind) is
equivalent to its wavefunction or that its wavefunction
can be measured. More explicitly, we said that decisions
are components of the wavefunction, and therefore are
wavefunctions themselves. Yet, in the final analysis, we
can “measure” the decision actually made, which would
amount to measuring the wavefunction itself, and wave-
functions are not obeservables. Decisions cannot simul-
taneously be observables and operators without violating
the machinery of quantum mechanics. A careful analysis
of proper language reassures us of this conclusion. We say
that a particle “exists in a superposition of states”. We
do not say that a particle “is a superposition of states”.
The latter statement would assert that a physical par-
ticle (or mind) is itself a linear combination of complex
waveforms, which is not the case.
Rather, particles are objects that have properties. Par-
ticles have position, momentum, charge, spin, and many
other interesting properties. The wavefunction is simply
a mathematical tool for predicting the behavior of the
particle given these properties.
In what follows, we shall remake this analysis to re-
flect the statement that a particle “exists in a superposi-
tion of states”. The fundamental analogy we shall draw
is that the mind is a quantum mechanical particle, and
therefore can be modeled using quantum mechanics. This
analogy is importantly different from the statement that
the mind is a superposition of quantum states. Finally,
mirroring Feynman’s path-integral formulation of quan-
tum mechanics, we shall formulate a quantum theory of
decision making.
II. ILLUSTRATION OF CONFLATING THE
MIND AND MEASUREABLE QUANTITIES
WITH WAVEFUNCTIONS AND STATES
The error of attempting to analogize a mind to a wave-
form rather than a particle is anything but semantic. In
order to achieve the desired behaviour of the model, the
mind must be a particle not a waveform. Furthermore,
if the mind is a waveform, it has no observables, and the
theory collapses entirely.
A. A First Example
As an example of this misconception at
work, we examine a paper considering Quan-
tum Decision Theory (QDT). This paper is
not unique, it was simply the example chosen.
Quantum field inspired model of decision making,
2by Bagarello, Basieva, and Kherennikov, rightly and
sharply distinguishes between a theory that requires
actual quantum physical phenomena in the brain, and
one which only uses the machinery of quantum theory
to model human behaiour. Their theory and the theory
presented in this paper are emphatically the latter.
However, from this point on, troubling statements fol-
low. “In the simplest model, the mental state (the belief
state) of an agent Alice, is represented as a quantum
state ψ and questions or tasks as quantum observables...
Alice’s decision is represented as a measurement of the
observable A at some instant in time” [2]
The first part of the statement, illustrates precisely the
mistake highlighted earlier. Neither Alice, nor her “belief
state” can accurately be called a quantum state. Alice
is an observable person, she exists in the real world. Her
beliefs are observables. One can ask Alice what she be-
lieves, presumably by operating with Aˆ to get the oberv-
able A as suggested above, and recieving a response cor-
responding to a particular belief. In this scenario, the
wavefunction, which is, by definition, immeasurable has
been measured. If what is stated in the paper were liter-
ally true, Alice’s mind would simply not exist. The states
are not real. They are mathematical tools only. This is
an example of conflating the mind, an observable thing,
with its wavefunction, which is not observable.
Other deep misconceptions are related to this funda-
mental misunderstanding. In the paper, Alice’s environ-
ment also becomes a set of states. Again, this is im-
possible as the environment is observable. The root of
the issue may be the use of the word state in quantum
mechanics.
III. THE CORRECTED ANALOGY BETWEEN
DECISION MAKING AND QUANTUM THEORY
The fundamental analogy of our model is that a deci-
sion maker is like a quantum particle. As particles exist
in real spacetime, our decision maker will exist in decision
space.
Definition III.1. Decision Space: The decision space
is defined to be the set of all decisions available to the
decision maker at any given time t.
If the decision maker exists in decision space as a parti-
cle exists in spacetime, the next task is to determine the
equations of motion of the decision maker in this space.
Here, as in Feynman’s formulation of quantum mechan-
ics, this is done by finding a Lagrangian. In physics,
Lagrangians expose the topology of the kinetic and po-
tential energy around a particle. Here we shall construct
a similar topology for decision space. Note carefully that
we are not directly constructing the states. Instead,
the states will be calculated from the energetic topol-
ogy of the decision space, defined by the Lagrangian.
Just as in real quantum mechanics, where one derives
the states from the shape of the potential, not the other
way around.
IV. USING THIS ANALOGY TO DEVELOP A
QUANTUM THEORY OF DECISION MAKING
The following analysis will be agnostic to the exact
form of the Lagrangan, so long as all terms are of or-
der less than 2, for the reasons discussed by Feynman.
[1] Extensions of this theory with perturbation analysis
will also be valid. For clarity, however, we shall do a
quick exercise in constructing a Lagrangian for this type
of problem, taking the Principle of Least Action as inspi-
ration.
V. A SAMPLE LAGRANGIAN
Perhaps one of the most famous analyses of human
behavior comes from the great philosopher John Stuart
Mill who posits a world based on Utility. Here, we as-
sert that any decision maker, at any given point in time,
wants to maximize their utility, which we shall identify
as minimizing the cost they will incur as a result of their
decision. In other terms:
Utility = Benefit− Cost
So the quantity we wish to minimize over time is:
SU = Min
∫
ti+1
ti
−Utility dt = Min
∫
ti+1
ti
(Cost−Benefit) dt
The reader familiar with the Lagrangian formulation
of Classical Mechanics ought to immediately recognize
this as a statement of the Priciple of Least Action. SU is
analogous to:
S = Min
∫ ti+1
ti
L(x, t)dt
So our Lagrangian ends up being −Utility.
VI. CONSTRUCTING THE THEORY USING
FEYNMAN AS A GUIDE
The question we are now asking is identical to the one
posed by Feynman. Whereas he was concerned with the
paths of particles through space-time, we are concerned
with the paths of decision makers through decision space.
We begin, as Feynman does, by defining the proba-
bility that the decision maker’s path through decision
space is contained within a region R of decision space to
be |φ(R)|. We call φ(R) the probability amplitude. [1]
Those that are familiar with quantum mechanics would
3be advised to carefully note that φ(R) is the probabil-
ity amplitude of an entire path, not a single position.
Feynman’s great observation of every possible path the
particle could take in the region R was that:
The paths contriubte equally in magnitude;
but the phase of their contribution is the clas-
sical action (in units of ~); i.e., the time inte-
gral of the Lagrangian taken along the path.
[1]
And so, the probability amplitude for our decision maker
is:
φ(R) = lim
ǫ→0
∫
R
exp
[
i
~
∑
i
SU (xi+1, xi)
]
. . .
dxi+1
A
dxi
A
. . .
where ǫ is a small step in time and for our purposes,
the units of ~ are arbitrary.
To complete the analogy, our next task is to reconcile
this definition with our more usual definitions of wave-
functions in quantum mechanics. We begin by observ-
ing that no matter how the region R is constructed, it
must have at least one basis vector that aligns with time.
Continuing to follow Feynman’s work, we separate R into
two regions: R′, which occurs entirely in the past, and
R′′ which occurs entirely in the future. With a little
fancy algebra, we conclude, exactly as Feynman did that
“|φ(R′, R′′)|2 is the (relative) probability that if the sys-
tem were in region R′ it will be found later in R′′”. Now
this is starting to look more familiar. But the usual form
of quantum mechanics has a state that predicts future
behaviour solely based on the past and the present. [1]
We take on Feynman’s definition of[1]:
φ(R′, R′′) =
∫
χ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t)dx
where,
ψ(xk, t) = lim
ǫ→0
∫
R′
exp
[
i
~
k−1∑
i=−∞
SU (xi+1, xi)
]
dxk−1
A
dxk−2
A
. . .
χ(xk, t)
∗ = lim
ǫ→0
∫
R′′
exp
[
i
~
∞∑
i=k
SU (xi+1, xi)
]
1
A
dxk+1
A
dxk+2
A
. . .
In Feynman’s own words: “Thus, we can say: the prob-
ability that a system in state ψ will be found by an ex-
periment whose characteristic state is χ (or, more loosely,
the chance that a system in state ψ will appear to be in
χ) is: ∣∣∣∣
∫
χ∗(x, t)ψ(x, t)dx
∣∣∣∣
2
.” [1]
Observe here that ψ is the “state” the decision maker
is in and the choices he or she makes are positions. Most
importantly, they are observables. Now that we have
defined ψ and its associated probability, the traditional
interpretations of quantum mechanics can take over.
VII. EXAMPLE PROBLEM
For clarity, we will define this problem as a financial
one, where costs and benefits are more easily identifiable,
but the method is easily extensible to even the most qual-
itative or heuristic analyses.
Let’s take the common problem of considering the pur-
chase of an expensive sports car. For simplicity’s sake,
let us also assume that you must buy a car, though it
need not be the expensive sports car.
A. Decision Factors
There are several factors to be considered in this prob-
lem. First and most obvious is the upfront cost. Assume
the sports car costs $100, 000, and a reasonable sedan
costs $50, 000 In both cases the need for a car has been
fulfilled. It seems reasonable that the benefit of having a
car at all would be equal to the cost of the sedan. For the
sports car, the insurance payments are likely to be higher
than for a more standard sedan, and therefore add addi-
tional costs. Finally, there are more subjective consider-
ations to the particular decision maker. For instance, the
percieved social or personal benefits that may come from
owning the sports car over the sedan. The more expen-
sive car could have significantly more value to a collector
than the average person. For this example assume there
are moderate social benefits to having the car, but there
are no negative consequences to having the sedan.
B. Construct Lagrangian
Now, construct the Lagrangians:
L(Car) = Sticker+Insurance−Social Benefit−Car Benefit
L(Sports Car) = 100, 000+ 500− 200− 50, 000 = 50, 300
L(Sedan) = 50, 000 + 200− 0− 50, 000 = 200
Note that there are no units or arbitrary units. This is
intentional and actually useful. Dollars do not represent
physical attributes and the value of money is a subjective
attribute. This allows us to account for the subjective
value determinations made by the decision maker. In
other words, the Lagrangians are specific to a particular
decision maker.
C. Calculate States
Using our definitions of ψ and χ above we have:
χ(Sports Car) = exp (iL(Sports Car)) = exp (i× 50, 300)
4χ(Sedan) = exp (iL(Sedan)) = exp (i× 200)
ψ(Initial State) = χ(SportsCar) ∗ χ(Sedan)
Now from this point, our physical intuition tells us that
one will most likely buy the sedan. In the final analy-
sis, according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, this is
exactly what happens. However, in more complex cir-
cumstances it may not be so clear. Furthermore, these
numbers are heavily dependant on what the percieved
social and personal benefits are. These are very subjec-
tive numbers that depend heavily on the decision maker.
These calculations give
P (χ(Sports Car)) = 0.002090
P (χ(Sedan)) = 0.997910
P (ψ(Initial State)) = 1
If we repeat these calculations with a higher personal
value, $10, 000, placed on owning the sports car the num-
bers change dramatically.
P (χ(Sports Car)) = 0.561141
P (χ(Sedan)) = 0.438859
P (ψ(Initial State)) = 1
This shows how the model is responsive to the subjec-
tive whims of the particular decision maker being mod-
elled.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We can see for the example of the sports car that the
model behaves as expected. The more value the decision
maker places on something, the more likely they are to
choose it. The value here is subjective, specific to the
person making the decision. Most of all however, it is a
much more direct and precise analogy to the structure of
quantum mechanics, allowing for more sensible interpre-
tation.
Future efforts could consist of generating full visual-
izations of decision spaces in the complex plane, adding
uncertainties to Lagrangians, or even having multiple
time steps representing multiple paths through multiple
choices. Another particularly interesting idea would be
to use techniques usually associated with Machine Learn-
ing to derive the Lagrangians for key decision makers or
decision making bodies.
This theory still needs to be extensively experimentally
tested and furthermore, there remain significant ques-
tions as to the proper normalization of the Lagrangians
and adopted value metrics. Nonetheless, with further de-
velopment, it is believed this model could be improved
and expanded upon to devlop a full Theory of Decision
Making.
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